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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates how foreign ownership shapes bank information environments. Using a sample of 
listed banks from 60 countries over 1997-2012 we show that foreign ownership is significantly associated 
with greater (lower) informativeness (synchronicity) in bank stock prices. We also find that stock returns 
of foreign-owned banks reflect more information about future earnings. In addition, the positive association 
between price informativeness and foreign ownership is stronger for foreign-owned banks in countries with 
stronger governance, stronger banking supervision, and lower monitoring costs. Overall, our evidence 
suggests foreign ownership reduces bank opacity by exporting governance, yielding important implications 
for regulators and governments. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite an extensive body of international business (IB) research on globalization (see a review by Verbeke 
et al., 2018), researchers pay relatively little attention to banking globalization. However, banks are 
instrumental in promoting IB because of their roles in financing global trade and foreign investments of 
multinational companies (MNCs) (Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2017), as well as in maintaining the 
stability of international financial systems (Laeven, 2013). The 2008-09 global credit crisis is a vivid 
example of how instability in the banking sectors could impair global trade and investment flows.  
Many argue that weak bank transparency is a major cause of the crisis because poor-quality 
information makes asset risk opaque and the lack of disclosure aggravates conflicts between different bank 
stakeholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Hyytinen and Takalo, 2002; Bushman and Williams, 2012; Bushman, 
2014). Over the decades, various international institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), and the Financial Stability Board, have proposed 
prudential regulations for banks. They have also campaigned for greater emphasis on effective corporate 
governance and improved disclosure for banks. For instance, Pillar Three of the Basel II Accord focuses 
specifically on enhancing the transparency of the global banking sectors by raising bank disclosure 
requirements and strengthening market discipline (BCBS, 2015). A number of scholars, such as Berlin et 
al. (1991), Bhattacharya et al. (1998), Laeven (2013), and Bushman (2014), also advocate increased 
transparency in banking systems. Given these increasing calls from policymakers and scholars, and 
considering the importance of bank stability to global trade, it is essential for IB researchers to have a better 
understanding of what enhances bank transparency within a globalization context to ensure efficacy and 
sustainability in international trade. 
 In this paper, we examine whether foreign ownership increases bank transparency through 
improved corporate governance. In an agency-theory framework, effective governance, such as monitoring 
by owners, boards of directors, and other market participants, could improve corporate transparency by 
reducing managers’ incentives to exploit or hoard private information for their own advantage (see, e.g., 
Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Gul et al., 2011; Armstrong et al., 2012; 
Armstrong et al., 2014). Also, a recent, growing body of IB and international finance literature theorizes 
and documents that foreign owners who actively monitor corporate insiders play a significant role in 
exporting corporate governance to subsidiaries or invested entities in host countries (Gillian and Starks, 
2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011; He et al., 2013; Han, 2015; Bena et al., 2017; 
Cumming et al., 2017).  
In line with this governance-mobility view, several cross-border M&A studies show that target 
firms benefit from importing superior governance and contracting devices from acquirers headquartered in 
good-governance countries (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Martynova and Renneborg, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 
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2011; Ellis et al., 2017; Renneboog et al., 2017). The banking literature also suggests that foreign owners 
bring better governance and risk-management systems to their local counterparts, in turn improving 
efficiency (Berger et al., 2009). Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that foreign ownership is 
positively associated with bank transparency because governance spills over from home countries with 
stronger governance or banking regulations. 
To test this hypothesis, we measure bank transparency by the amount of firm-specific variation in 
bank stock returns, which reflects the incorporation of private information (see, e.g., Morck et al., 2000; 
Jiang et al., 2009). When information environments improve, stock prices incorporate more variation in 
firm-specific factors and thus synchronize less with market factors. Following this literature, our dependent 
variable is price synchronicity, estimated as the logistic-transformed R2 from an expanded market model. 
Our explanatory variable of interest is an indicator for majority foreign ownership (Foreign) that equals 1 
for banks with 50% or more foreign ownership, and 0 otherwise. Using a sample of 710 banks from 60 
countries over 1997-2012, our baseline results show that foreign bank ownership is associated with 
significantly lower (higher) price synchronicity (informativeness). This relationship is robust to alternative 
fixed effects, estimation approaches, sample periods, standard errors, and use of discretionary loan loss 
provisions as an alternative proxy for bank transparency. 
A potential concern is endogeneity. Unobserved country or bank characteristics that codetermine 
foreign ownership and price synchronicity could bias our estimates. Additionally, foreign investors may 
prefer to invest in countries with more transparent banking systems (Leuz et al., 2009). Because the 
treatment status is not randomly assigned to the sample banks, our results may be subject to potential 
selection issues or reverse causality. To address these concerns, we examine the results using bank fixed 
effects, instrumental variable estimation, and dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimation, all showing that endogeneity does not drive our results. 
Another concern recent studies raise (see, e.g., Dasgupta et al., 2010; Xing and Anderson, 2011) is 
that stock price synchronicity may be noisy and unreliable in capturing information flows. To address this, 
we study the extent to which stock prices incorporate future earnings information, and we examine its 
relationship to foreign bank ownership. Our results show that stock prices of foreign-owned banks contain 
significantly more future earnings information than those of local banks, consistent with our hypothesis. 
 To test the theory of governance mobility, we evaluate whether the quality of corporate governance 
and banking regulations in the home countries governs the relationship between foreign bank ownership 
and stock price informativeness. If foreign owners export better governance practices and improve bank 
information environments, then increases in stock price informativeness should be more pronounced for 
foreign-owned banks from home countries with relatively strong corporate governance or banking 
regulations. Moreover, because monitoring foreign subsidiaries and invested companies incurs significant 
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transportation and communication costs (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Mian, 2006; Kang and Kim, 2008), 
physical distance between the home and host countries could reduce the spillover of corporate governance 
across borders. Our results support these predictions.  
Our paper makes several important contributions to the literature. First, we add to an emerging 
body of IB literature theorizing and documenting that governance does indeed travel abroad through, for 
example, foreign ownership, cross-border M&As, etc. (see, e.g., Aguilera, et al., 2017; Cumming, et al., 
2017; Ellis et al., 2017; Miletkov et al., 2017). We complement this literature by analyzing banks, an 
industry of central importance to IB regarding the stability of global trade, revealing that foreign bank 
ownership is another effective channel through which governance moves across borders.  
Second, we add to the growing literature on the economic consequences of banking globalization.1 
However, relatively few studies analyze its role in shaping banks’ information environments. This question 
has far-reaching implications for IB because bank opacity, often considered a major cause of banking crises, 
could seriously disrupt global trade. Our findings uncover a bright side of banking globalization in 
mitigating information asymmetry.  
Third, using more general samples of firms, our paper relates to studies on the link between foreign 
investors and the information content of stock prices (see, e.g., Gul et al., 2010). For instance, He et al. 
(2013) and Han (2015) show that foreign shareholders enhance price informativeness due to a greater ability 
in processing value-relevant information. However, our paper differs from theirs in several ways. First, our 
sample contains global banks; theirs consist of mainly nonfinancial firms. Banks are distinct from 
nonfinancial firms in that they are opaque (Morgan, 2002), highly levered, and interconnected; their failures 
could have adverse systemic consequences that disrupt global markets and trade. As such, we extend the 
significant contribution these studies make by offering practical implications regarding market and trade 
stability for regulators as well as scholars in IB. Second, our theoretical framework, motivated by recent, 
growing IB literature, asserts that increased corporate governance exported by foreign bank owners 
enhances information environments. Although more intense monitoring by foreign shareholders is a 
potential channel that He et al. (2013) consider, their study only analyzes the host countries’ governance 
characteristics. However, because we know the home countries of foreign-owned banks, we are able to 
examine in a governance context whether relative distance between home and host countries explains price 
informativeness, directly testing the theory.  
Our findings yield several policy implications. First, despite the growing literature, researchers still 
do not fully understand the costs and benefits of foreign bank ownership, as well as their tradeoffs. Some 
studies document a few dark sides of foreign banks, such as cherry-picking elite clients and not venturing 
out of urban territories in host markets. They conclude that foreign banks fail to enhance domestic credit 
and financial inclusion (Detragiache et al., 2008; Allen et al., 2011; Claessens and van Horen, 2014; Beck 
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and Brown, 2015; Allen et al., 2017). Recent financial crises also raise concerns that foreign bank ownership 
is a potential channel for transmitting liquidity shocks across borders (Dages et al., 2000; Cetorelli and 
Goldberg, 2012). As such, foreign ownership of banks remains controversial, especially in emerging 
markets where foreign bank ownership is limited or banned.  
Our study adds to this policy debate by uncovering a new bright side of foreign bank ownership: 
enhanced banking information environments through governance spillovers. Because transparency is 
important for creating a domestic banking environment that fosters credit creation and efficiency in capital 
allocation (Greenspan, 1996; Morgan, 2002), emerging economies with low incomes, high opacity, weak 
governance, and ineffective banking regulations likely benefit the most from governance spillovers induced 
by foreign bank ownership. Regulators should consider such benefits when evaluating policies regarding 
foreign bank entry.  
Second, reduced information asymmetry due to foreign bank ownership strengthens market-based 
oversight, regulatory efficiency, and market discipline.2 Third, by reducing price synchronicity among 
banks, foreign ownership reduces the likelihood of concurrent price declines during difficult economic 
conditions, contributing to market and trade stability. Finally, as shown in events such as the Great 
Depression and “Brexit” in the UK, and amid nationalism’s surging popularity in some countries, we add 
to the partisan debate about globalism versus nationalism. Our evidence suggests that governments should 
foster legislation supporting the convergence of governance. 
 We structure the rest of the paper as follows: section 2 reviews the literature and develops our 
hypotheses. Section 3 explains our sample, variable construction, and empirical methodology, and it 
presents our descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents our test results, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 The Implications of Banking Globalization 
There has been a dramatic globalization trend in banking and a constantly increasing demand for 
transparency around the world over the past several decades.3 Although a core body of IB research seeks 
to understand the antecedents, processes, and consequences of globalization in modern corporations (see 
Verbeke et al., 2018), researchers pay relatively little attention to banking globalization and its relevance 
for market stability.  
In fact, increased banking globalization has several important implications for IB. First, foreign-
owned banks, often major credit suppliers for MNCs, play a key role in providing liquidity locally as well 
as in facilitating foreign direct investments (Detragiache et al., 2008; Gormley, 2010; Claessens et al., 2017). 
Second, increases in banking competition and thus the potential shifts in the quality of financial 
intermediation due to the entry of foreign banks could benefit or harm the export businesses in the host 
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countries (Beck et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2009; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009, 2012; Bruno and Hauswald, 
2014). Third, foreign-owned banks could help facilitate information flows among global trading partners 
(Portes and Rey, 2005), thereby narrowing the information gap and fostering more trustworthy trade 
relationships. Fourth, because the efficacy and extent of international trade depend on the health of the 
global financial and banking sectors, foreign-owned banks have implications for IB through their role in 
market stability (Iacovone and Zavacka, 2009; Gormley, 2010; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Cetorell and 
Goldberg, 2012). In particular, the extent to which banking systems should integrate into the global 
financial economy is an important question for economic growth, financial stability, and global businesses.   
 
2.2 The Importance of Bank Information Environments 
A bank shapes its information environment through the quality of its financial disclosure, including the 
timeliness, reliability, and discretionary choices of its financial reporting. Improving bank transparency has 
been one of the most important prudential policy initiatives globally over the past decades (Rochet, 1992; 
Bushman and Williams, 2015). There are at least four reasons.  
First, informational transparency strengthens market discipline in bank risk-taking. From an ex ante 
perspective, anticipating that informed investors will respond swiftly to increased risk by demanding higher 
returns, bank managers would be less prone to taking excessive risks, thereby enhancing stability. In an ex 
post sense, bank transparency also disciplines managers to the extent that distressed securities could trigger 
regulatory interventions to restore stability (Flannery, 1998, 2001), thereby threatening careers and casting 
doubt on managerial abilities.  
Second, informational transparency improves bank stability by supporting governance mechanisms 
(Bushman and Smith, 2001; Bushman, 2014, 2016). Banks are prone to moral-hazard problems, and their 
managers have incentives to invest in excessively risky projects because of high leverage (Laeven, 2013), 
limited discipline from insured depositors (Merton, 1977; Hett and Schmidt, 2017), asset opacity (Morgan, 
2002; Acharya et al., 2016), and implicit government guarantees (Gropp et al., 2011). In this regard, bank 
information that is reliable and publicly available not only helps appraise the performance of bank managers, 
but also supports monitoring bank directors, owners, and regulators, which in turn mitigates agency costs 
and systemic risk. 
Third, bank transparency reduces uncertainty about solvency, as well as panic and rollover risk 
among depositors and short-term creditors, and thus helps prevent bank failures and runs (Gorton and 
Huang, 2006; Ratnovski, 2013). Finally, managerial incentives such as stock grants, option grants, and 
other forms of equity-related pay often tie to stock prices. Because stock prices convey useful information 
about managers’ efforts and performance, the information content of bank stock prices is useful in 
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structuring executive incentives to better align the interests of owners and agents, thereby increasing the 
effectiveness of such incentives (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Kang and Liu, 2008; Alok et al., 2016).  
 
2.3 Corporate Governance, Banking Regulations, and Information Environments 
Among the factors that shape a bank’s information environment is corporate governance, which researchers 
widely discuss (see, e.g., Enriques and Volpin, 2007; Mehran et al., 2011; Laeven, 2013). Better governance 
improves corporate transparency by encouraging management to increase public disclosures and provide 
more relevant and timely information to external parties (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Ferreira 
and Laux, 2007; Gul et al., 2011; Armstrong et al., 2012; Armstrong et al., 2014). Consistent with this view, 
empirical studies document that companies with better governance have higher-quality disclosures, lower 
incidences of financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996), less earnings management (Dechow et al., 1996), 
and more precise earnings forecasts (Ajinkya et al., 2005).4  
Because banks are heavily regulated, one governance-related factor that shapes a bank’s 
information environment is its external supervisory and regulatory environment. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) has published a number of microprudential and macroprudential regulatory 
guidance documents that emphasize the importance of capital adequacy, effective corporate governance, 
and improved accounting and disclosure practices for banks. In particular, the Basel II Accord, proposed in 
2004, contains three pillars: minimum capital requirements, official supervisory power, and market 
discipline mechanisms. The first pillar concerns the ongoing maintenance of regulatory capital that is 
required to protect banks against different kinds of risks, such as credit risk, operational risk, and market 
risk. The second pillar gives supervisory authorities more power to take actions in preventing and correcting 
problems. The third pillar promotes market discipline and bank transparency by imposing various 
regulatory disclosure requirements that enable market participants to access key information about a bank’s 
capital adequacy and risk exposures (BCBS, 2015). More recently, in response to the global financial crisis, 
the Basel III Accord raised the regulatory capital requirements, set up new requirements for funding 
illiquidity, and introduced new prudential regulations specifically targeting systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs). 
Several studies confirm the significant role of banking supervision and regulations in determining 
bank efficiency (Barth et al., 2013b) and risk-taking behaviors (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Importantly, 
Francis et al. (2015) document that more stringent capital regulations and increased incentives for private 
monitoring are associated with less synchronized bank stock prices, consistent with improved bank 
information environments. 
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2.4 The International Mobility of Corporate Governance 
Although an extensive amount of IB and international finance literature uncovers various governance 
factors that may determine MNCs’ global strategies, most research views corporate governance as 
“location-specific” (Filatotchev and Wright, 2011). Recently, however, some researchers challenge this 
view. Cumming et al. (2017), for example, discuss at least two theoretical perspectives that could explain 
why governance travels across countries. The first is the agency perspective, focusing on the achievement 
of efficiency outcomes. Under this perspective, MNCs import or export corporate governance in order to 
gain access to superior resources, managerial expertise, and monitoring competencies. The second is the 
institutional perspective, positing that MNCs adjust their corporate governance structures and processes to 
increase their legitimacy among local stakeholders who may have different expectations of governance 
quality. Although the two perspectives differ in emphases, they both suggest there is a demand-side 
explanation for governance mobility. 
Two of the most important ways corporate governance travels across countries are international 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and foreign ownership. In the context of cross-border M&As, Ellis et al. 
(2017) propose that governance moves under an agency theoretical framework (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Part of the synergy value created in cross-border M&As in which acquirers are from countries with 
relatively strong shareholder protections is due to improved post-merger governance over the target’s assets 
(Martynova and Renneborg, 2008).   
Governance can also travel internationally through foreign ownership. Specifically, foreign 
investors who are active monitors change governance mechanisms and standards across borders (Gillan and 
Starks, 2003; Cumming et al., 2017). For example, Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Aggarwal et al. (2011) 
document that foreign investors from countries with strong shareholder protections significantly improve 
the corporate governance structures in target firms. Among Japanese firms, Aguilera et al. (2017) show that 
foreign investors’ institutional backgrounds affect managerial discretion and optimism in earnings forecasts 
and subsequent revisions. Moreover, a related strand of banking literature documents that foreign owners 
improve bank efficiency in China, consistent with banks importing better governance systems from abroad 
(see, e.g., Berger et al., 2009).  
However, not all firms can effectively learn and copy governance practices from their foreign 
counterparts, because such learning often requires acquiring new and refining existing managerial and 
monitoring skills, investing in new technologies, and interacting with people with the right expertise 
(Cumming et al., 2017). In the process of importing governance, the degree of governance mobility likely 
depends on differences in regulatory and legal environments between the host and home countries. 
Moreover, because monitoring is more costly for foreign owners that are farther away from the host 
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countries, geographical proximity may determine the extent of governance mobility (Degryse and Ongena, 
2005; Mian, 2006; Kang and Kim, 2008). 
 
2.5 Hypotheses Development  
Our previous discussions suggest that if governance travels across countries via foreign ownership, then 
banking globalization could improve bank informational transparency. Our first hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Foreign bank ownership improves the quality of bank information 
environments. 
 The governance-mobility explanation yields several additional testable predictions. First, if foreign 
owners export and promote improved corporate governance abroad, we expect a larger improvement in 
information environments for foreign-owned banks originating from economies with better governance or 
regulatory environments. Second, among foreign-owned banks, we expect higher-quality information 
environments when governance quality or the regulatory environment is relatively strong in the home 
countries; that is, the relative differences between the home and host countries are larger. Third, because 
monitoring incurs significant transportation and communication costs (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Mian, 
2006; Kang and Kim, 2008), learning governance practices from abroad may be less effective the farther 
the home and host countries are from each other physically. Based on these arguments, our second set of 
hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 2a: The positive association between foreign bank ownership and the quality 
of the bank information environment is more pronounced when foreign owners come from 
countries with stronger corporate governance and banking regulations. 
Hypothesis 2b: Among foreign-owned banks, the quality of the bank information 
environment increases with the relative difference in corporate governance or in banking 
regulatory environment between the home and host countries. 
Hypothesis 2c: Among foreign-owned banks, the positive association between the relative 
distance in corporate governance or banking regulatory environment (between the home 
and host countries), and the quality of bank information environment decreases with the 
physical distance between the home and host countries. 
 
3 SAMPLE, VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1 Sample 
Our initial sample begins with all banks that have an International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) 
from the Bankscope database from 1996 to 2012. We collect bank information such as headquarters location, 
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total assets, capital, earnings, bad loans, etc., from Bankscope; we collect information about foreign bank 
ownership from Claessens and van Horen (2014).5 We download bank security information, including stock 
prices, return indexes, shares outstanding, and exchange listings from Worldscope/DataStream (DS). We 
download the daily return series of the DS-calculated local market indexes, bank indexes, and a world 
market index to proxy for the local market, the local industry, and the world market risk factors, respectively. 
All variables are denominated in U.S. dollars.6 We exclude banks whose primary stock exchanges are 
different from their host countries. Our final sample consists of 710 banks (7,550 bank-year observations) 
from 60 countries between 1997 and 2012.7 In all, 137 (19.3%) of these banks are foreign-owned. We 
collect several macroeconomic indicators from the World Bank, and we collect country-level governance 
indexes from Djankov et al. (2008) and Kaufmann et al. (2006). The location information is from 
www.mapsofworld.com and the distances are from the CEPII database.8 
 
3.2 Variable Measurements 
3.2.1 Bank-specific return variation. We construct a proxy for the bank information environment 
― bank-specific return variation. French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) propose that a significant portion 
of stock return variation is unexplained by market movements and that a firm-specific component of return 
variation captures the amount of private information embedded in stock prices. Many accounting and 
finance studies verify it as a measure of information flow in prices (see, e.g., Morck et al., 2000; Jin and 
Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009; Gul et al., 2011). They broadly agree that when information environments 
improve, stock prices incorporate more (fewer) variation in firm-specific (market) factors. Following this 
strand of literature, we estimate bank-specific return variation, or price synchronicity, as the estimated R2 
from an expanded market model: 
 rit = β0i + β1i ritW + β2i rit-1L + β3i ritL + β4i rit+1L + β5i rit-1I + β6i ritI + β7i rit+1I + εit ,   (1) 
where i is a bank and t is a week. The variable rit represents weekly Wednesday-to-Wednesday returns of 
bank stock i in week t.9 The ritW variable is the weekly return of a DS-calculated world market equity index, 
ritL is the weekly return of a DS-calculated local market equity index, and ritI is the weekly return of a DS-
calculated local bank equity index. We allow for nonsynchronous trading by including lead and lag terms 
for the local market and bank indexes (Dimson, 1979). We estimate equation (1) for each bank year and 
require a minimum of 25 weeks of available observations for the estimation. 
 The estimated R2 from equation (1) measures the proportion of return variation explained by the 
world market, local market, and local bank equity indexes; it is thus a proxy for price synchronicity. Because 
R2 is bounded between 0 and 1, such boundedness may complicate the empirical estimation. Following the 
11 
 
extant literature, we apply a logistic transformation to the estimated R2 to obtain our price synchronicity 
measure, SYNCH, as shown in equation (2): 
SYNCHit = log [ R2it / ( 1 – R2it )]     (2) 
3.2.2 Foreign bank ownership. Our foreign bank ownership data is from Claessens and van 
Horen (2014), who manually collect the data from various sources, including bank websites, annual reports, 
web resources by banking regulators and central banks, corporate governance reports, local stock exchanges, 
SEC filings, newspaper articles, and country experts.10 Because tracing all changes in ownership through 
time is impossible due to the large sample of banks, the authors follow standard practice in the literature 
and identify a bank as foreign-owned if foreign owners hold 50% or more of the shares in a given year, and 
as domestic otherwise. Following their definition, we construct a foreign bank indicator variable that equals 
1 when foreign owners hold 50% or more of a bank’s shares, and 0 otherwise.  
 
3.2.3 Control variables. We consider various bank characteristics that may affect price 
synchronicity, including bank size, profitability, income from nontraditional banking activities, deposit 
funding, capital ratios, and credit quality of banks’ loan portfolios. The detailed definitions are in appendix 
A.1. Finally, cross-listing could reduce price informativeness in emerging markets because the associated 
increase in analyst coverage encourages the production of marketwide information (Fernandes and Ferreira, 
2008). We construct a dummy that equals 1 for banks with cross-listing in a given year, and zero otherwise.   
We also control for several country characteristics in our analyses to account for differences in 
economic conditions and the degree of financial development across countries. Less developed or 
malfunctioning stock markets likely have thinly traded stocks and less informative stock prices. Following 
Bekaert and Harvey (1997), we measure stock market development as the ratio of market capitalization to 
GDP (Stock market cap/GDP). To account for differences in trading intensity across stock markets, we 
include annualized turnover ratios of local stocks (Stock market turnover ratio). To account for differences 
in economic growth, we include annual rates of change in real GDP (GDP growth) and consumer price 
index (CPI) in our tests. Moreover, following Stulz and Williamson (2003), we use the ratio of total private 
credit to GDP as a proxy for financial development (Financial development). Finally, countries’ market 
size is captured by log total population (Ln(Population)). All country controls are from the World Bank 
Development Indicators database. 
 
12 
 
3.2.4 Descriptive statistics. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Panel A reports sample 
distribution by year. Covering 1997-2012, our sample contains 472 banks per year on average. The statistics 
show that SYNCH increases during crisis periods (in 1998 and 2008-2009), consistent with possible 
contagion. The proportion of foreign-owned banks increases over time from 6.1% in 1997 to 19.3% in 2012.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel B reports sample distribution by country. The top five countries in terms of coverage are 
Japan (12.4%), Denmark (7.5%), India (4.1%), Italy (3.9%), and France (3.6%). Among the 10 countries 
with the most (least) informative bank stock prices, three (six) are member states of the European Union; 
the United States is ranked 39th in ascending order. The five countries with the largest foreign ownership 
are Luxembourg (100%), Slovakia (97.1%), Czech Republic (88.1%), Poland (74.4%), and Hong Kong 
(61.3%). These statistics closely resemble those in Claessens and van Horen (2014). The detailed sample 
distribution by country and year is in table IA.1 of the online appendix. 
 Panel A of table 2 reports summary statistics. Bank size is heavily skewed, and mean (median) 
total assets is $45.6 ($8.1) billion. The mean (median) R2 and SYNCH are 48.2% (46.5%) and -0.06 (-0.14), 
respectively. Foreign-owned banks constitute 14.7% of our observations. The other statistics resemble those 
reported by Houston et al. (2010).  
Panel B presents univariate comparisons between foreign-owned and non-foreign-owned banks. 
The analysis shows that R2 and SYNCH are significantly lower among foreign-owned banks than non-
foreign-owned banks in both mean and median tests, showing preliminary support for hypothesis 1. Besides, 
foreign-owned banks are more profitable, more reliant on deposit funding, smaller, have higher noninterest 
income, and have larger capital buffers. The host countries of foreign-owned banks have higher inflation, 
more GDP growth, less stock market turnover, smaller populations, and lower financial development than 
those of non-foreign-owned banks. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
This section reports results on the association between foreign ownership and bank stock price 
informativeness based on a panel multivariate regression framework, written as follows:   
SYNCHijt = β0 + β1 Foreignijt-1 + δ Xijt-1 + Country FE + Year FE + εijt ,   (3) 
where i is a bank, j is a country, and t is a year. SYNCHijt is the estimated stock price synchronicity variable 
as described in section 3.2.1; Foreignijt-1 is an indicator variable that equals 1 when foreign ownership is 
50% or more, and 0 otherwise; Xijt-1 is a vector of lagged bank control variables as defined in section 3.2.3. 
We include country and year fixed effects in the baseline specification to control for time-invariant, 
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unobserved country characteristics and marketwide shocks. In alternative specifications, we include the 
country control variables defined in section 3.2.3 in the regressions. All explanatory variables lag by one 
year and thus are determined prior to year t to alleviate potential endogeneity concerns. Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level to account for serial correlations. To reduce the effects of outliers, we winsorize 
the variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
4.1 The Relationship between Foreign Bank Ownership and Bank Stock Price Informativeness 
Panel A of table 3 reports the results of regressing price synchronicity on foreign bank ownership. In 
addition to Foreign, model (1) includes country and year fixed effects; model (2) includes bank- and 
country-level controls and year fixed effects. Models (3) to (5) apply alternative fixed effects.  
The results from model (1) suggest a negative and significant (at the 1% level) relationship between 
Foreign and SYNCH, supporting hypothesis 1. Model (2) controls for bank and country characteristics and 
shows that the significantly negative association between Foreign and SYNCH remains robust. Model (3) 
replaces the country characteristics with country fixed effects and shows that the negative coefficient for 
Foreign remains significant. Our results are economically significant. Using the estimates from model (3) 
and holding all other variables at mean values, a move of Foreign from 0 to 1 decreases implied R2 by 
17.3% (from 0.497 to 0.412).11  
To alleviate the concern that time-variant, unobservable country factors codetermine foreign 
ownership and price synchronicity, model (4) uses country-year interacted fixed effects to absorb time-
varying country characteristics, confirming that our results are robust. Model (5) introduces bank fixed 
effects to absorb time-invariant bank characteristics. Note that bank fixed-effects regression only analyzes 
within-bank changes in foreign ownership and price synchronicity. As model (5) shows, the negative 
coefficient for Foreign remains significant at the 10% level, revealing a within-bank increase in price 
informativeness after a change in major ownership. 
As for the control variables, larger banks have more synchronized prices, consistent with Gul et al. 
(2011). Cross-listings are positively associated with price synchronicity, consistent with Fernandes and 
Ferreira (2008). Bank profitability, deposit funding, and capital ratios also positively correlate with price 
synchronicity. Overall, our results support hypothesis 1.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2 Robustness Tests 
Panel B of table 3 presents several robustness tests. All models include the baseline controls and country 
and year fixed effects, if not stated otherwise. We only report the estimates for Foreign for brevity. 
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In row (1), we replace SYNCH, which is log-transformed, with the estimated R-squared. Our results 
are similar in magnitude (a foreign bank has 13.7% higher R-squared) and significance. In rows (2) and (3), 
we apply alternative estimation techniques, including the between-effects estimators and Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) cross-sectional regressions with Newey and West (1987) correction (with no year fixed effects).Our 
results hold. Row (4) tests whether the over-representation of certain countries drives our results. We 
estimate a weighted-least-squares (WLS) regression and calculate weights as the inverse of the number of 
observations in each country; each country receives equal weight in the estimation. As shown, our results 
are similar and significant.  
In row (5), we estimate a median regression that is less influenced by potential outliers than an OLS 
regression, confirming that our results are intact. Row (6) examines whether the global financial crisis 
drives our results by restricting our sample to end in 2006. Our results are not much affected. Rows (7) and 
(8) apply alternative standard errors double-clustered by bank and year, and by country and year. Our results 
remain robust. 
 Prior studies document that the influence of foreign banks on local credit growth and other 
economic outcomes may vary with the market and economic development of the host countries. For 
instance, Allen et al. (2017) find that in Kenya foreign banks play a less positive role in access to financing 
than local and government banks do, indicative of foreign banks’ strategies in targeting clients with higher 
incomes. Detragiache et al. (2008) show that foreign bank concentration in emerging markets is associated 
with lower credit and welfare due to their lower ability to monitor soft information. In light of the potential 
dark sides of foreign bank ownership, rows (9) to (13) examine whether the level of economic and financial 
development of the host countries may affect the coefficient of interest.  
We consider five indicators of economic and financial development for the host countries. The first 
is an indicator that equals 1 for advanced economies and 0 for emerging countries following the IMF’s 
classification. The second, Financial development, is the ratio of total private credit to GDP. The third is 
Stock market cap/GDP, which is a proxy of the degree of stock market development. The fourth is GDP 
growth, which captures the rate of economic growth. The fifth is a legal origin indicator that equals 1 for 
civil law countries and 0 for common law countries.12 We interact each economic indicator with Foreign 
and find that the interaction terms between Foreign and the host country variables are all insignificant. 
Importantly, Foreign remains negatively and significantly associated with price synchronicity. The 
unabridged version of these results is in table IA.3 of the online appendix.  
 
4.3 Endogeneity Tests 
If unobserved bank or country characteristics determine foreign bank ownership and price informativeness, 
our estimations would be biased (omitted-variable bias). Reverse causality or selection issues might also 
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drive our results if foreign investors prefer to invest in firms in countries with better governance or 
disclosure quality (Leuz et al., 2009). We employ an instrumental variable approach and dynamic panel 
system GMM estimation to address these concerns.13,14 
First, we employ the instrumental variables approach and estimate a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression to isolate the effect of foreign bank ownership on price synchronicity.15 Our first instrument is 
log absolute geographical distance from the equator (Ln(Latitude)). The endowment theory (Acemoglu et 
al., 2001) posits that during the colonial period, Europeans adopted different colonization strategies 
depending on the feasibility of settlement. In colonies where mortality rates were low, Europeans endowed 
more in developing institutions to support private property. These institutions endured after independence 
and shaped subsequent developments, such as property rights and financial development. 16  We thus 
measure initial endowments by their absolute distance from the equator, as climates and disease 
environments are less hospitable nearer to the equator (Easterly and Levine, 2003). If foreign investors 
prefer countries with better institutions (Leuz et al., 2009), we thus expect greater foreign ownership in 
countries farther from the equator.17 Latitudes are from www.mapsofworld.com. 
 Our second instrument is the log of 1 plus the distance between the bank’s home city and the host 
country’s capital city (Ln(1+Distance from bank city to capital city)). The economic geography literature 
posits that firms have incentives to place businesses near large markets because of increasing returns to 
scale, lower transportation costs, and greater consumer preferences for variety (Krugman, 1991; Redding, 
2013; Detragiache et al., 2008). Capital cities, which are often heavily populated, usually represent one of 
the largest markets within a country. Driven by such market-size-related benefits, we expect greater foreign 
bank presence near capital cities and thus a negative coefficient for Ln(1+Distance from bank city to capital 
city) in the first-stage regression. The location information is from the CEPII database. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Model (1) of table 4 reports the first-stage results of regressing Foreign on the two instruments, 
bank and country controls, and year fixed effects. The coefficients for both instruments are significant and 
have the expected signs. The F-statistics of excluded instruments in the first stage show that the instruments 
are jointly different from zero at the 1% level. The Cragg-Donald F-statistic is significant at the 1% level, 
rejecting the null hypothesis of weak instruments (Cragg and Donald, 1993). Further, the Hansen’s J 
overidentification test has a p-value of 0.258, increasing the likelihood that the two instruments are valid 
or uncorrelated with the error term (Hansen, 1982). Model (2) reports the second-stage results using the 
exogenous component of Foreign to explain SYNCH. The coefficient for the fitted Foreign remains 
negative and significant at the 5% level and is larger in magnitude than our baseline tests.  
Another potential concern is that the relation between price informativeness and foreign bank 
ownership may be dynamically endogenous. If past realizations of the dependent variable affect current 
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levels of some or all independent variables, both OLS and fixed effects regressions that do not take into 
account such dynamic relations would be biased (Wintoki et al., 2012). We estimate a two-step dynamic 
panel system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) that controls for lagged 
SYNCH in the regressions and exploits past bank information as instruments. Following Wintoki et al. 
(2012), we include the first- and second-period lagged dependent variables in the regressions.18 Model (3) 
of table 4 presents the estimation results, showing that the coefficient for Foreign remains significantly 
negative (at the 5% level). To check instrument validity, we test for the absence of second-order serial 
correlation in the residuals, finding that the test is passed. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions 
fails to reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity.  
 
4.4 Foreign Bank Ownership and Earning Innovations 
Although the R-squared-based stock return synchronicity measure is a common proxy for information flow, 
recent studies question its validity and reliability.19 To address this concern, we examine the extent to which 
investors incorporate future earnings information into stock prices, and we test its association with foreign-
owned banks. If stock prices contain future earnings information (Collins et al., 1994; Durnev et al., 2004) 
and stock prices of foreign-owned banks have greater earnings informativeness, the positive association 
between future earnings innovations and current stock returns would be stronger among foreign-owned 
banks.  
The accounting literature shows that stock returns follow this return-earning relation: 
Rt = β0 + β1 UEt + ∑ "#$%&#'% ∆(t(Et+k ) + et ,    (4) 
where Rt is annual stock returns in year t. UEt is Et - (t-1(Et ), the unexpected earnings in year t. ∆(t(Et+k) is 
the revision of market expectations about future earnings in year t+k from the beginning to the end of year 
t ((t-1(Et+k) - (t(Et+k)). Following Collins et al. (1994) and Lundholm and Myers (2002), we choose k=3 
because investors’ revisions of earnings growth rates tend to be over short horizons and returns have limited 
ability to anticipate earnings more than three years in advance (Kothari and Sloan, 1992). 
Following Collins et al. (1994), we proxy for UEt using the annual growth rate in bank net income 
in year t (∆Et). The term ∆(t(Et+k) is proxied by realized future growth rates in bank net income. Because 
market expectations are unobservable, we must control for several sources of measurement errors. We 
control for two — (t-1(Et) and (t-1(Et+k) — using the earnings-to-price ratio (E/MVt-1) in year t-1. Another 
source of measurement error is the future earnings growth in year t+k that is unanticipated in year t (UEt+k, 
defined as Et+k – (t(Et+k)), which we control for via the realized buy-and-hold future returns for year t+1 to 
t+3 following Lundholm and Myers (2002). As such, we formulate the following regression model and 
interact these terms with our foreign ownership indicator variable (bank subscript i and country subscript j 
are both suppressed for brevity): 
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Rt = β0 + β1 E/MVt-1 + β2 ∆Et + ∑ ")$#&#'% ∆+,$#+ β6 R(t+1 to t+3) + β7 Foreign   
+ (β8 E/MVt-1 + β9 ∆Et + ∑ "-$#&#'% ∆+,$#+ β13 R(t+1 to t+3)) × Foreign   
+ δ1 Xt-1+ (δ2 E/MVt-1 + δ3 ∆Et + ∑ .&$#&#'% ∆+,$#      
+ δ7 R(t+1 to t+3)) × Xt-1 + Country FE + εit ,    (5) 
where Rt is the buy-and-hold annual bank stock returns in year t. E/MVt-1 is net income in year t-1, scaled 
by market capitalization at the end of year t-1; we expect it to have a positive coefficient. ∆Et is the annual 
change in net income from year t-1 to t, scaled by market capitalization at the end of year t-1. R(t+1 to t+3) is 
the buy-and-hold stock return from the beginning of year t+1 to the end of year t+3, and we expect it to be 
negatively related to stock returns. Xt-1 is a vector of baseline bank controls; εit is the residual. Country fixed 
effects are included to account for time-invariant country differences in stock returns. We control for the 
interaction between our earnings and future returns variables with the bank controls in the regressions, but 
we only report the estimates for the variables of our interest for brevity.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 Table 5 reports the estimation for equation (5). As model (1) shows, the coefficient for Foreign × 
ΔEt+2 is positive and significant at the 5% level, consistent with hypothesis 1, suggesting that stock prices 
of foreign-owned banks incorporate more information about earnings growth two years in advance. The 
estimate for E/MVt-1 is significantly positive as expected, but it is significantly smaller for foreign-owned 
banks (at the 10% level). The estimate for future returns (R(t+1 to t+3)) is significantly positive, which is 
surprising, suggesting that the sources of measurement errors may be different among global banks.  
  Model (2) presents an alternative model specification that aggregates the three future earnings 
growth variables: ∆Ei(t+1 to t+3) is the sum of annual changes in net income over years t+1 to t+3, scaled by 
market capitalization at the end of year t-1, similarly interacted with Foreign and other bank controls in the 
regression. Our results show that the estimate for Foreign × ΔE(t+1 to t+3) is significantly positive (at the 5% 
level), again consistent with stock prices of foreign-owned banks having greater informativeness.  
For robustness, we estimate an alternative cross-sectional earnings model following Bai et al. 
(2016). We again find that stock prices of foreign-owned banks reflect more earnings information two years 
in advance compared to non-foreign-owned banks. These unreported results are in table IA.9 of the online 
appendix. 
 
18 
 
4.5 Foreign Bank Ownership, Corporate Governance Mobility, and Price Informativeness 
4.5.1 Do the home country’s governance and banking regulatory environment matter? In this 
section, we test whether the negative association between foreign bank ownership and price synchronicity 
varies with home countries’ governance and bank regulatory environment (hypothesis 2a).  
We use three country governance indexes. The first is the revised anti-director-rights index; the 
second is the anti-self-dealing index, both from Djankov et al. (2008). The anti-director-rights index 
measures how well a country protects minority shareholders based on six legal rights granted to them. The 
anti-self-dealing index measures how well a country protects shareholders against corporate insiders’ self-
dealing. The third is the World Governance Index (WGI), measured as the average of six governance 
indicators capturing government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and 
accountability, and control of corruption, respectively, from Kaufmann et al. (2006).  
We focus on three aspects of bank regulations relating to the three pillars of the Basel II Accord, 
namely, minimum capital requirement (Pillar One), supervisory review process (Pillar Two), and market 
discipline (Pillar Three). In particular, we collect three country-level variables from the four worldwide 
surveys on bank regulations of Barth et al. (2004, 2006, 2008, and 2013a), namely, Capital regulatory index, 
Official supervisory power, and Private monitoring index to proxy for Pillar One, Pillar Two, and Pillar 
Three of the Basel II Accord, respectively.20  Capital regulatory index is an index of overall capital 
stringency and is the sum of the answers to several survey questions relating to the extent of regulatory 
requirements in bank capital and to the sources of funds that count as regulatory capital. Official supervisory 
power is a measure of the power of supervisory agencies; we measure it using answers to 14 questions on 
the extent to which supervisory authorities have the authority to take action in preventing and correcting 
problems. Private monitoring index is a measure of the extent of bank disclosure requirements and 
incentives to increase private monitoring. We construct it using answers to several survey questions, such 
as “Is an external audit compulsory for banks?” and “Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public?” 
For each of the three governance indexes and three banking regulatory variables, we divide Foreign 
into two indicator variables based on its respective sample median. For instance, Foreign (High anti-
director-rights index) equals 1 when a foreign bank’s home country has an above-median anti-director-
rights index; it equals 0 otherwise. We estimate the baseline models using the split Foreign variables and 
report the estimation in table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 As shown in models (1) to (3), the negative association of foreign bank ownership with price 
synchronicity is only significant when home countries have above-median values in the anti-director-rights 
index, anti-self-dealing index, and WGIs, supporting hypothesis 2a. The Wald tests show that the 
coefficients for Foreign are significantly different between the high- and low-governance groups for the 
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anti-director-rights index and the anti-self-dealing index. These results suggest that the increased price 
informativeness due to foreign ownership likely stems from home countries’ governance, consistent with 
foreign-owned banks exporting governance overseas.  
 As for the banking regulatory variables, the results from models (4) to (6) exhibit a similar pattern, 
despite being less significant: the negative association between Foreign and price synchronicity is more 
pronounced when home countries have above-median values in the three banking regulation variables (such 
negative association is only significant when home countries have better supervisory power). Nonetheless, 
the results from the Wald tests show that the coefficients for Foreign between the high and low regulatory 
variables are not significantly different. These findings suggest that foreign-owned banks from home 
countries with stronger supervision likely have better practices and thus better information environments. 
     
4.5.2 Does relative distance in governance and regulation between home and host countries 
matter? In this section, we test hypotheses 2b and 2c to determine whether relative differences in 
governance and banking regulatory environments between the home and host countries determine price 
informativeness, and whether such relation varies with geographical distance.  
For each foreign bank in our sample, we subtract each of the three governance indexes and the three 
banking regulation variables of the host country from that of the home country, and we examine the 
relationship between the relative differences with price synchronicity. To illustrate, a positive value of Anti-
director-rights index (Home-Host) indicates that the home country has better shareholder protections than 
the host country. Geographical distance is the distance (in miles) between a foreign bank’s city (in the host 
country) and its home country’s capital city.21, 22 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 Table 7 reports these results. Models (1) to (3) show that the differences in anti-self-dealing index 
and WGI enter negatively and significantly (at the 10% level or better). Models (4) to (6) show that, of the 
three bank regulation variables, only the differences in Official supervisory power are negatively and 
significantly (at the 10% level) associated with price synchronicity. These findings support hypothesis 2b.   
In models (7) to (9), we interact the governance distance with log geographical distance to explain 
price synchronicity; in model (10), we interact the three banking regulatory variables with log geographical 
distance. In line with our predictions, differences in the anti-self-dealing index and WGI are negatively and 
significantly associated with SYNCH (at the 5% level or better) (see models 8 and 9). For both the anti-self-
dealing index and the WGI, their interaction terms with geographical distance are positive and significant 
at the 10% level or better. In model (10), we find that the relative distance in Official supervisory power is 
negatively associated with price synchronicity, and such negative relation strengthens when geographical 
distance decreases. These results are consistent with hypothesis 2c.  
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Specifically, for geographical distances (between the home and host countries) in the 25th (345.5 
miles) and 75th (4464.7 miles) percentiles, an increase in the home-minus-host difference in the anti-self-
dealing index [WGI] {Official supervisory power} from the 25th to the 75th percentiles reduces stock price 
synchronicity by -15.9% [-33.3%] {-13.3%} and -4.0% [-2.1%] {+12.2%}, respectively, holding other 
variables at mean values. Overall, these results support both hypotheses 2b and 2c. 
 
4.6 Other Considerations 
Our findings thus far suggest that foreign bank ownership plays an important role in improving banks’ 
information environments. To shed more light on the economic mechanism behind these findings, we 
examine the disclosure quality of foreign-owned banks, and specifically, we focus on their loan loss 
provisions ― a major device banks use to manage earnings and regulatory capital. We follow Beatty and 
Liao (2014) and Jiang et al. (2016) and estimate a bank’s “abnormal” loan loss provisions, or discretionary 
loan loss provisions, that cannot be explained by bank fundamentals. Consistent with improved information 
environments, our tests (untabulated) show that foreign-owned banks have significantly lower discretionary 
loan loss provisions. Our results are robust to excluding positive discretionary loan loss provisions (which 
reduce earnings) that may represent accounting discretion to enhance transparency; they are also robust to 
using an alternative extended sample consisting of 2,639 banks from 134 countries. Moreover, such 
negative association is more pronounced when home countries have lower governance quality. For 
conciseness, these results are unreported but are in table IA.10 of the online appendix. 
 An issue we have not explored thus far in our study is the possibility that governance mechanisms 
substitute or complement one another. Prior studies analyze the interaction between internal and external 
governance mechanisms, such as between directors and the takeover market (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994), 
between executive compensation and the takeover market (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1998; John et al., 2000), 
between the legal environment and board monitoring (e.g., Marcel and Cowen, 2014), between ownership 
structure and board composition (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991), and between external audits and board 
monitoring (Desender et al., 2016) (see John and Senbet, 1998; and Aguilera et al., 2016).  
We first shed light on the potential interaction between foreign bank ownership and an external 
governance mechanism: the banking regulatory environment. Specifically, we collect from the worldwide 
surveys of Barth et al. (2004, 2006, 2008, and 2013a) the three variables for Basel II’s three pillars and an 
external governance index, which aggregates survey answers relating to the strength of external audit, banks’ 
financial disclosure requirements, accounting practices, and external ratings and creditor monitoring. To 
the extent that the banking regulatory environment and monitoring by foreign owners are partial 
complements, our results may be more pronounced for host countries that have stronger regulations in bank 
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supervision and disclosure. However, our results (untabulated) show little evidence of interaction between 
Foreign and these external governance variables in explaining SYNCH.  
Furthermore, we test whether foreign ownership and board governance are complements or 
substitutes. Because firm-level board data is unavailable for our sample of global banks, we collect the 
timing of country-specific board-related major reforms for 40 of our sample countries from Fauver et al. 
(2017). We examine whether the effect of such reforms in relation to (1) board independence and (2) audit 
committee and audit independence on price synchronicity depends on foreign ownership. We find that the 
negative association between foreign bank ownership and price synchronicity significantly (at the 10% 
level) strengthens after major reforms in board independence, but not with audit committee reforms, 
consistent with a complementary relation. To keep our paper concise, these results are in table IA.11 of the 
online appendix. Nonetheless, because the board reform variables are at the country level, our results are 
subject to measurement errors and are merely suggestive.  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
Under both the agency and institutional theoretical perspectives, recent IB research posits that corporate 
governance travels across countries through, for example, foreign ownership, international M&As, etc. (see, 
e.g., Cumming et al., 2017; Ellis et al., 2017). This study tests this emerging theory of governance mobility 
in the context of banking and, more specifically, investigates whether foreign ownership increases bank 
transparency via governance spillover from home countries. Because bank opacity is likely a major cause 
of banking crises (Bushman, 2014, 2016), a better understanding of what determines bank opacity in the 
context of globalization helps regulators and IB scholars stabilize financial markets and international trade. 
Based on a large sample of global banks from 60 countries over 1997-2012, we find that foreign 
ownership is associated significantly with higher (lower) price informativeness (synchronicity) among bank 
stock prices. Further tests show that stock prices of foreign-owned banks reflect more information about 
future earnings growth than those of non-foreign-owned banks. The positive association between foreign 
ownership and price informativeness is more pronounced for foreign-owned banks from home countries 
with relatively strong governance and banking supervision, as well as when monitoring costs are low. Our 
evidence is consistent with foreign ownership increasing price informativeness through improved corporate 
governance.  
Our findings contribute to the IB literature by uncovering a positive effect of globalization on bank 
information environments. Consistent with the emerging theory of international governance mobility, our 
study shows that foreign bank ownership is an effective channel through which governance travels across 
borders. Our results have direct implications for regulators, as more informative bank stock prices due to 
foreign ownership could help increase market discipline and thus the efficiency of supervision. Enhanced 
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bank transparency also helps international investors better discriminate between banks, improving the 
efficiency of capital allocation. For policymakers, fostering legislation that supports the importation or 
exportation of good governance may help stabilize markets and global trade. 
We acknowledge a few limitations of our study that may offer possible directions for future 
research. First, firm-level data on corporate governance, such as governance provisions and board 
information, are unavailable for our sample of global banks. Although our results are in line with the theory 
of international governance mobility, we are unable to offer direct evidence of precisely what components 
of bank governance improve when foreign ownership increases and whether foreign ownership substitutes 
or complements other governance mechanisms. Future research efforts in compiling and analyzing more 
granular bank data are warranted.  
Second, although our results are robust to alternative empirical approaches and tests, our main 
measure of stock price informativeness ― firm-specific return variation ― is nonetheless noisy in capturing 
information flows. This concern about measurement errors could be more severe for developing economies 
whose stock markets are undeveloped, inefficient, or malfunctioning, and where the role of stock prices in 
signaling and directing market activities is ineffective. As such, our findings have less to say about whether 
the effects of foreign ownership on bank transparency diverge across countries. Finally, because we exclude 
countries that ban foreign ownership in banks (e.g., Ethiopia), our findings may not generalize to such 
countries.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides the descriptive and summary statistics for our international bank sample. The sample period is 
from 1997 to 2012. All bank fundamental information is from Bankscope. All stock information is from Datastream 
and Worldscope. Foreign bank ownership data is from the dataset compiled by Claessens and van Horen (2014). 
The final sample consists of 7,550 bank-year observations for 710 unique banks from 60 countries. SYNCH is bank 
stock price synchronicity; Foreign equals 1 for banks with 50% or more foreign ownership, and zero otherwise. 
Panel A reports the number of observations plus average SYNCH and Foreign by year. Panel B reports the number 
of observations, proportion, and the average SYNCH and Foreign by country. 
  
Panel A: By Year 
Year Obs. SYNCH Foreign 
1997 328 -0.252 0.061 
1998 341 -0.107 0.076 
1999 378 -0.401 0.093 
2000 420 -0.326 0.110 
2001 429 -0.329 0.117 
2002 446 -0.257 0.123 
2003 449 -0.327 0.131 
2004 465 -0.088 0.127 
2005 478 -0.202 0.132 
2006 528 0.057 0.157 
2007 547 -0.016 0.177 
2008 567 0.267 0.183 
2009 558 0.128 0.192 
2010 559 0.146 0.181 
2011 543 0.273 0.190 
2012 514 0.019 0.193 
Total 7550     
Panel B: By Country 
Country Obs. % SYNCH Foreign 
Argentina 90 1.2% 0.349 0.322 
Australia 129 1.7% 1.042 0.093 
Austria 126 1.7% 0.120 0.079 
Bahrain  51 0.7% -1.048 0.275 
Belgium  11 0.1% -0.278 0.000 
Brazil  246 3.3% -0.053 0.089 
Bulgaria  30 0.4% 0.674 0.200 
Canada  144 1.9% 0.740 0.056 
Chile  104 1.4% 0.101 0.288 
China  54 0.7% -0.698 0.000 
Colombia  6 0.1% -1.314 0.000 
Croatia  96 1.3% -0.500 0.375 
Cyprus  30 0.4% 0.279 0.033 
Czech Republic  42 0.6% 0.989 0.881 
Denmark  565 7.5% -0.913 0.012 
Egypt  176 2.3% -0.870 0.369 
Finland  16 0.2% 1.915 0.000 
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France  275 3.6% -0.247 0.044 
Germany  147 1.9% -0.050 0.156 
Greece  48 0.6% 0.211 0.208 
Hong Kong  124 1.6% -0.106 0.613 
Hungary  28 0.4% 1.632 0.107 
India  309 4.1% 0.032 0.045 
Indonesia  66 0.9% -1.464 0.409 
Ireland  35 0.5% 0.636 0.000 
Israel  140 1.9% 0.518 0.050 
Italy  293 3.9% -0.033 0.003 
Japan  934 12.4% -0.243 0.003 
Jordan  69 0.9% -0.709 0.362 
Korea, Republic of  124 1.6% -0.287 0.129 
Kuwait  61 0.8% -0.421 0.115 
Luxembourg  57 0.8% 0.168 1.000 
Mexico  13 0.2% -0.477 0.000 
Morocco  62 0.8% -0.025 0.484 
Netherlands  54 0.7% 0.459 0.037 
Nigeria  31 0.4% -0.316 0.097 
Norway  228 3.0% -0.721 0.000 
Oman  33 0.4% 0.084 0.000 
Pakistan  234 3.1% -0.055 0.282 
Peru  80 1.1% -0.581 0.538 
Philippines  171 2.3% -0.364 0.082 
Poland  215 2.8% 0.263 0.744 
Portugal  80 1.1% 0.538 0.075 
Qatar  40 0.5% 0.282 0.000 
Romania  37 0.5% 1.488 0.324 
Russian Federation  96 1.3% 0.003 0.042 
Singapore  59 0.8% 0.818 0.000 
Slovakia  35 0.5% 0.167 0.971 
Slovenia  42 0.6% 0.254 0.500 
South Africa  74 1.0% -0.100 0.095 
Spain  127 1.7% 0.386 0.055 
Sri Lanka  110 1.5% 0.297 0.000 
Sweden  48 0.6% 1.580 0.000 
Switzerland  136 1.8% -0.158 0.103 
Taiwan, Province of China  210 2.8% 0.123 0.043 
Thailand  178 2.4% 0.423 0.202 
Turkey  155 2.1% 1.011 0.103 
United Kingdom  93 1.2% 0.190 0.000 
United States 148 2.0% 0.261 0.115 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of  135 1.8% -0.494 0.356 
Total 7550 100%   
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TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
This table presents the summary statistics (panel A) and the univariate analysis (panel B). Panel A reports the 
number of observations, means, medians, standard derivations, and percentile statistics of the main variables in this 
study. Panel B compares the means and medians of these variables between the foreign-owned banks (1,107 
observations) and the non-foreign-owned banks (6,443 observations). It reports their differences with statistical 
significance based on the two-sample t-tests (mean tests) and the Wilcoxon signed rank tests (median tests). The *, 
**, and *** symbols denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. 25th  Median 75th 
SYNCH 7550 -0.061 1.219 -0.881 -0.140 0.675 
R2 7550 0.482 0.235 0.293 0.465 0.663 
Foreign 7550 0.147 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA 7550 0.008 0.014 0.003 0.008 0.013 
Noninterest income/TA 7550 0.016 0.019 0.006 0.012 0.019 
Deposits/TA 7550 0.714 0.195 0.630 0.777 0.857 
Total assets 7550 45611 122129 1838 8194 29007 
Ln(TA) 7550 8.928 2.014 7.517 9.011 10.275 
Capital 7550 0.090 0.061 0.054 0.074 0.111 
LLP/TA 7550 0.006 0.009 0.001 0.004 0.007 
Cross-listing indicator 7550 0.329 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CPI 7029 0.038 0.051 0.014 0.025 0.046 
GDP growth 7340 0.029 0.035 0.012 0.028 0.048 
Stock market cap/GDP 5743 0.642 0.824 0.180 0.458 0.777 
Stock market turnover ratio 5624 0.780 0.539 0.409 0.686 1.068 
Ln(Population) 7340 17.412 1.594 15.884 17.711 18.663 
Financial development 7002 1.698 27.623 0.406 0.878 1.490 
 
Panel B: Univariate Analysis          
 
Foreign=1 
(1107 obs.) 
 Foreign=0 
(6443 obs.) 
 Difference (1-0) 
  Mean Median   Mean  Median   Mean Median 
SYNCH -0.160 -0.158  -0.045 -0.139  -0.116 *** -0.020 ** 
R2 0.466 0.460  0.485 0.465  -0.019 ** -0.005 ** 
Foreign 1.000 1.000  0.000 0.000  1.000 *** 1.000 *** 
ROA 0.011 0.010  0.008 0.007  0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
Noninterest income/TA 0.018 0.015  0.016 0.012  0.002 *** 0.003 *** 
Deposits/TA 0.742 0.786  0.710 0.774  0.032 *** 0.012  
Total assets 19780 5328  50050 9153  -30269 *** -3825 *** 
Ln(TA) 8.599 8.581  8.984 9.122  -0.385 *** -0.541 *** 
Capital 0.103 0.091  0.088 0.071  0.015 *** 0.020 *** 
Loan loss provisions/TA 0.007 0.004  0.006 0.004  0.001 * 0.000 * 
Cross-listing indicator 0.291 0.000  0.336 0.000  -0.045 *** 0.000 *** 
CPI 0.046 0.033  0.036 0.024  0.010 *** 0.009 *** 
GDP growth 0.036 0.037  0.028 0.026  0.007 *** 0.011 *** 
Stock market cap/GDP 0.650 0.140  0.640 0.486  0.010  -0.346 *** 
Stock market turnover ratio 0.490 0.415  0.831 0.740  -0.340 *** -0.325 *** 
Ln(Population) 16.968 17.310   17.490 17.877   -0.522 *** -0.567 *** 
Financial development 0.636 0.473   1.887 0.948   -1.251   -0.476 *** 
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TABLE 3 
Foreign Ownership and Price Synchronicity of Bank Stocks 
 
Panel A of this table reports the results of our baseline tests. The dependent variable is the price synchronicity of bank 
stocks (SYNCH). The main variable of interest is Foreign, which equals 1 when a bank has 50% or more foreign 
ownership, and zero otherwise. The bank controls include return on assets (ROA), noninterest income to total assets 
(Noninterest income/TA), total deposits to total assets (Deposits/TA), log total assets (Ln(TA)), equity capital to total 
assets (Capital), loan loss provisions to total assets (Loan loss provisions/TA), and an indicator variable for cross-
listing (Cross-listing indicator). Model 2 controls for six country characteristics, including the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP (Stock market cap/GDP), the growth in real GDP (GDP growth), the rate of change in the 
national consumer price index (CPI), annualized turnover ratios of domestic stocks (Stock market turnover ratio), the 
log of total population (Ln(Population)), and the ratio of total private credit to GDP (Financial development). The 
coefficient estimates for these country controls are suppressed for brevity. The standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level, unless stated otherwise. Panel B reports the robustness results. For brevity, we report only the coefficient 
estimates on Foreign. Model specifications in panel B follow model (3) of panel A. In row 1, the nontransformed R-
squared is the dependent variable. Rows 2 and 3 report the between-effect (BE) estimator and the Fama and MacBeth 
(FM) cross-sectional regression, respectively. Row 4 reports a weighted least squares (WLS) regression in which the 
weight is the inverse of the number of observations in each country. Row 5 reports a median regression that is less 
subject to the influences of outliers. Row 6 uses a subsample covering the period from 1997 to 2006. Rows 7 and 8 
use alternative standard errors, clustered by bank and year, and by country and year, respectively. The *, **, and *** 
symbols denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Baseline Tests 
 SYNCH 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Foreign -0.322*** -0.294*** -0.347*** -0.315*** -0.183* 
 (0.094) (0.101) (0.068) (0.071) (0.097) 
ROA  5.487** 4.620*** 5.398*** 2.363* 
  (2.241) (1.567) (1.753) (1.364) 
Noninterest income/TA  2.697* 1.090 1.051 1.559 
  (1.395) (1.107) (1.107) (1.215) 
Deposits/TA  0.160 0.452*** 0.442*** -0.098 
  (0.151) (0.151) (0.155) (0.169) 
Ln(TA)  0.373*** 0.459*** 0.464*** 0.236*** 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.054) 
Capital  1.104** 3.070*** 2.887*** 1.354*** 
  (0.525) (0.475) (0.499) (0.439) 
Loan loss provisions/TA  7.770*** -1.830 0.155 0.743 
  (2.857) (1.923) (2.134) (1.892) 
Cross-listing indicator  0.339*** 0.250*** 0.290*** 0.171** 
  (0.071) (0.056) (0.060) (0.070) 
Intercept 0.279 -2.185*** -4.194*** -3.442*** -2.179*** 
  (0.260) (0.338) (0.346) (0.641) (0.521) 
Country controls  Yes    
Bank FE     Yes 
Country FE Yes  Yes   
Year FE Yes Yes Yes   
Country×Year FE    Yes Yes 
Obs. 7550 5191 7550 7550 7550 
Adj. R2 0.234 0.381 0.482 0.567 0.352 
 
 
 
Panel B: Robustness Tests 
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  R2  SYNCH 
    Coef. S.E.   Coef. S.E. 
(1) Use R2 as dependent variable -0.066*** (0.013)    
(2) Between-estimator    -0.407*** (0.088) 
(3) Fama-MacBeth regression    -0.268*** (0.039) 
(4) Weighted-least-squares (WLS)    -0.396*** (0.095) 
(5) Median regression    -0.311*** (0.048) 
(6) Subsample: 1996-2006    -0.310*** (0.086) 
(7) Cluster standard errors at the bank-year level    -0.347*** (0.067) 
(8) Cluster standard errors at the country-year level 
  
-0.347*** (0.069) 
(9) Controlling for the interaction between  
Foreign and Advanced 
   
-0.329*** (0.085) 
(10) Controlling for the interaction between  
Foreign and Financial development 
   
-0.279** (0.118) 
(11) Controlling for the interaction between  
Foreign and Stock market cap/GDP 
   
-0.380*** (0.091) 
(12) Controlling for the interaction between  
Foreign and GDP Growth 
   
-0.345*** (0.072) 
(13) Controlling for the interaction between  
Foreign and Civil law 
      -0.328*** (0.097) 
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TABLE 4 
Endogeneity Tests 
 
This table presents the instrumental variable estimation using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach and the dynamic 
panel system generalized method of moments (DPS GMM) approach. For the 2SLS regression, the dependent variables are 
the foreign bank ownership indicator (Foreign) for the first-stage regression (in model 1) and bank stock price synchronicity 
(SYNCH) for the second-stage regression (model 2). Ln(latitude) is the natural logarithm of transformed latitude (in decimal 
form), which measures the geographical distance between the bank’s city (in the host country) and the equator; 
Ln(1+Distance from bank city to capital city) is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the geographical distance (in miles) from 
the bank’s city of location to the host country’s capital city. All bank controls are identical to those in the baseline model 
and are defined in the appendix. We control for the five country characteristics and year fixed effects and cluster the standard 
errors at the bank level. Model 3 presents the results estimated using the two-step dynamic panel system GMM estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Following Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012), we 
control for the first-period (SYNCH (-1)) and second-period lagged dependent variables (SYNCH (-2)) in the regression. We 
treat all explanatory variables except the year dummies as endogenous and instrument them with the t-3 to t-5 lagged 
dependent and independent variables for the difference equation and their respective lagged differences for the level 
regression. We report the tests of first-order and second-order serial correlations in the residuals and the Hansen test of 
overidentification under the null of instrument validity. The *, **, and *** symbols denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Estimation approaches 2SLS IV  DPS GMM 
 1st stage 2nd stage   
Dependent variables Foreign SYNCH  SYNCH 
  (1) (2)   (3) 
Ln(Latitude) 0.074***    
 (0.022)    
Ln(1+Distance from bank city to capital city) -0.015**    
 (0.007)    
Foreign (Fitted Foreign for model 2)  -1.301**  -0.692** 
  (0.662)  (0.294) 
ROA -1.097 4.127  -17.981 
 (1.043) (2.544)  (12.012) 
Noninterest income/TA 0.010 3.091**  -5.612 
 (0.590) (1.551)  (6.935) 
Deposits/TA 0.166*** 0.304*  0.016 
 (0.058) (0.172)  (0.694) 
Ln(TA) 0.010 0.384***  0.130 
 (0.010) (0.023)  (0.222) 
Capital 0.482* 1.437**  3.215* 
 (0.275) (0.640)  (1.742) 
Loan loss provisions/TA 0.715 7.898**  14.268 
 (1.291) (3.069)  (13.301) 
Cross-listing indicator -0.038 0.304***  0.300* 
 (0.029) (0.075)  (0.163) 
SYNCH (-1)    0.424* 
    (0.251) 
SYNCH (-2)    -0.221 
       (0.216) 
Country controls Yes Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes 
Obs. 5132 5132  4272 
Adj. R2 0.121 0.278   
F-statistics of the excluded IVs 7.750***    
Cragg-Donald F-statistics of the excluded IVs 54.320***    
AR(1) test p-value    0.004 
AR(2) test p-value    0.194 
Hansen test of overidentification p-value   0.258   0.603 
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TABLE 5 
Foreign Bank Ownership and Earnings Innovations 
This table reports the results of regressions examining the extent to which current stock prices reflect future 
earnings information. The dependent variable is buy-and-hold bank stock annual returns (Rt). E/MVt-1 is the net 
income in year t-1, scaled by market capitalization at the end of year t-1. ∆Et is the annual growth rate in net 
income from year t-1 to t, scaled by market capitalization at the end of year t-1 (i.e., at the beginning of return 
calculation). R(t+1 to t+3) is the buy-and-hold stock returns from the beginning of year t+1 to the end of year t+3; we 
expect it to be negatively related to stock returns. ∆Ei(t+1 to t+3) is the sum of the annual changes in net income over 
year t+1 to t+3, scaled by market capitalization at the end of year t-1. The *, **, and *** symbols denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Rt 
  (1) (2) 
E/MVt-1 0.043*** 0.038*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) 
∆Et -0.044 -0.017 
 (0.047) (0.036) 
∆Et+1 0.017  
 (0.053)  
∆Et+2 0.029  
 (0.045)  
∆Et+3 -0.056  
 (0.037)  
∆E(t+1 to t+3)  -0.005 
  (0.017) 
R(t+1 to t+3) 0.111*** 0.107*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Foreign × E/MVt-1 -0.309* -0.213** 
 (0.161) (0.084) 
Foreign × ∆Et -0.032 -0.039 
 (0.035) (0.030) 
Foreign × ∆Et+1 -0.007  
 (0.126)  
Foreign × ∆Et+2 0.316**  
  (0.132)  
Foreign × ∆Et+3 -0.004  
 (0.088)  
Foreign × ∆E (t+1 to t+3)   0.122** 
    (0.053) 
Foreign × R(t+1 to t+3) 0.015 0.006 
 (0.031) (0.030) 
Foreign 0.034 0.018 
 (0.031) (0.030) 
Interaction between earnings innovations and all other controls Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Obs. 6,140 6,140 
Adj. R2 0.462 0.448 
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Table 6 
Does Home Country’s Governance and Banking Regulatory Environment Matter? 
 
This table presents the results of the regressions examining whether foreign ownership’s effect on bank stock price synchronicity 
depends on the home country’s governance quality and banking regulatory environment. The dependent variable is bank stock 
price synchronicity (SYNCH). We measure country governance using three proxies: the revised anti-director-rights index (Anti-
director-rights index), the anti-self-dealing index (Anti-self-dealing index), and the World Governance Index (WGI). We measure 
banking regulatory environment in three aspects, corresponding to Basel II Pillar One, Pillar Two, and Pillar Three, respectively, 
using worldwide survey data from Barth et al. (2004, 2006, 2008, and 2013a). Capital regulatory index is an index of overall 
capital stringency and is the sum of the answers to several survey questions relating to the extent of regulatory requirements in 
bank capital and to the sources of funds that count as regulatory capital. Official supervisory power is a measure of the power of 
supervisory agencies, measured using answers to 14 questions on the extent to which supervisory authorities have the authority 
to take actions in preventing and correcting problems. Private monitoring index is a measure of the extent of bank disclosure 
requirements and incentives to increase private monitoring. We divide the foreign ownership (Foreign) variable into two variables 
based on the sample median of the governance indexes and banking regulatory variables (in the foreign bank sample). To illustrate, 
Foreign (High [Low] governance index) equals 1 when a bank has 50% or more foreign ownership and its home country has an 
above-median (below-median) governance index; it equals zero otherwise. The bank controls are identical to those used in the 
baseline model, defined in the appendix, and their coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Year fixed effects are included. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level. The p-values of the Wald tests of coefficient equality between the divided foreign ownership 
variables are reported. The *, **, and *** symbols denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variables SYNCH 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign (High Anti-director index) -0.359**      
 (0.163)      
Foreign (Low Anti-director index) -0.010      
 (0.112)      
Foreign (High Anti-self-dealing index)  -0.365***     
  (0.125)     
Foreign (Low Anti-self-dealing index)  0.035     
  (0.121)     
Foreign (High World Governance Index)   -0.192**    
   (0.091)    
Foreign (Low World Governance Index)   -0.129    
   (0.096)    
Foreign (High Capital regulatory index)    -0.353   
    (0.219)   
Foreign (Low Capital regulatory index)    -0.092   
    (0.100)   
Foreign (High Official supervisory power)     -0.245*  
     (0.130)  
Foreign (Low Official supervisory power)     -0.041  
     (0.114)  
Foreign (High Private monitoring index)      -0.165 
      (0.143) 
Foreign (Low Private monitoring index)      -0.090 
      (0.103) 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7550 7550 7550 7,550 7,550 7,550 
Adj. R2 0.235 0.236 0.233 0.233 0.234 0.233 
Wald test of coefficient equality: H0: High-Low=0 0.069 0.014 0.788 0.262 0.183 0.600 
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Table 7 
Does the Relative Difference in Governance and Banking Regulatory Environment Matter? 
This table presents the regressions that examine whether differences in governance and banking regulatory environment between home and host countries explain bank stock price synchronicity on the foreign 
bank sample. The dependent variable is bank stock price synchronicity (SYNCH). We measure country governance using three proxies: the revised anti-director-rights index (Anti-director-rights index), the anti-
self-dealing index (Anti-self-dealing index), and the World Governance Index (WGI). Banking regulatory environment is measured in three aspects, corresponding to the Basel II Pillar One, Pillar Two, and Pillar 
Three, respectively, using worldwide survey data from Barth et al. (2004, 2006, 2008, and 2013a). Capital regulatory index is an index of overall capital stringency and defined as the sum of the answers to several 
survey questions relating to the extent of regulatory requirements in bank capital and to the sources of funds that count as regulatory capital. Official supervisory power is a measure of the power of supervisory 
agencies; we measure it using 14 questions on the extent to which supervisory authorities have the authority to take actions to prevent and correct problems. Private monitoring index is a measure of the extent of 
bank disclosure requirements and incentives to increase private monitoring. We calculate the relative difference in the governance indexes and banking regulatory variables between the home and host countries 
by subtracting each of these indexes and variables for the host country from those of the home country. We calculate geographical distance (in miles) between the bank’s city of location (in the host country) and 
its home country’s capital city (both measured at the center) by applying spherical geometry and trigonometric math functions to the latitudes and longitudes of the locations. The bank controls are identical to 
those used in the baseline model, and their coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Country fixed effects are included only when WGI is used. Standard errors 
are clustered at the bank level. The *, **, and *** symbols denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variables SYNCH 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Anti-director-rights index (Home-Host) -0.001       -0.240    
 (0.055)       (0.328)    
Anti-self-dealing index (Home-Host)  -0.681**       -3.087**   
  (0.338)       (1.502)   
WGI (Home-Host)   -0.206*       -1.622***  
   (0.119)       (0.489)  
Capital regulatory index (Home-Host)    0.031       -0.190 
    (0.029)       (0.211) 
Official supervisory power index (Home-Host)     -0.039*      -0.500* 
     (0.023)      (0.260) 
Private monitoring index (Home-Host)      -0.055     -0.031 
      (0.044)     (0.403) 
Anti-director-rights index (Home-Host)×Ln(Geographical distance)        0.032    
        (0.041)    
Anti-self-dealing index (Home-Host)×Ln(Geographical distance)         0.348*   
         (0.199)   
WGI (Home-Host)×Ln(Geographical distance)          0.190***  
          (0.064)  
Capital regulatory index (Home-Host)×Ln(Geographical distance)          0.035 
           (0.032) 
Official supervisory power index (Home-Host)×Ln(Geographical distance)          0.069** 
           (0.034) 
Private monitoring index (Home-Host)×Ln(Geographical distance)          -0.016 
           (0.052) 
Ln(Geographical distance)        -0.038 -0.054  0.011 
        (0.050) (0.054)  (0.065) 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE   Yes       Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 865 865 1,047 519 707 868  865 865 1,047 370 
Adj. R2 0.218 0.234 0.418 0.196 0.168 0.178   0.219 0.231 0.431 0.181 
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APPENDIX A.1 
Variable Definitions 
Variables  Description Source 
SYNCH A bank's stock price synchronicity measure, calculated based on the R2 estimated from an expanded market model 
using weekly bank stock returns. We apply a logistic transformation to the estimated R2 as follows: 
SYNCHit = log [ R2it / ( 1 – R2it )]. 
DataStream 
Foreign An indicator variable that equals 1 when a bank has 50% or more foreign ownership, and zero otherwise, in a given 
year. 
Claessens and van 
Horen (2014) 
ROA Net income to total assets. Bankscope 
Noninterest income/TA Noninterest income to total assets. Bankscope 
Deposits/TA Total deposits to total assets. Bankscope 
Ln(TA) Natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars. Bankscope 
Capital Total equity capital to total assets. Bankscope 
Loan loss provisions/TA Loan loss provisions to total assets. Bankscope 
Cross-listing indicator An indicator variable equal to 1 when a bank stock has at least one cross-listing, and zero otherwise, in a given year. Worldscope 
CPI Rate of change in the national consumer price index. World Bank 
GDP growth Rate of change in real gross domestic product (GDP). World Bank 
Stock market cap/GDP The ratio of market capitalization to GDP. World Bank 
Stock market turnover ratio The annualized turnover ratios of domestic stocks. Turnover ratio is the value of domestic stocks traded divided by their 
market capitalizations. 
World Bank 
Ln(Population) The natural logarithm of the total population in a country in a given year. World Bank 
Financial development The ratio of total private credit to gross domestic product (GDP). World Bank 
Anti-director-rights index The revised anti-director-rights index, which ranges from 0 to 6. This index measures how well a country protects its 
minority shareholders based on six legal rights granted to them. It is formed by adding 1 to the index for each legal 
right, including (1) shareholders can mail proxy votes; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to 
the general shareholders meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of 
directors is allowed; (4) there is an oppressed minorities mechanism; (5) shareholders have preemptive rights that can 
only be waived by a shareholders meeting; and (6) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder 
to call for an extraordinary shareholders meeting is less than or equal to 10%. 
Djankov, La Porta, 
López-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008) 
Anti-self-dealing index The anti-self-dealing index, which measures a country’s legal protections for minority shareholders against corporate 
insiders’ self-dealing. It is the average of ex ante and ex post private control of self-dealing indexes. The index of ex 
ante control of self-dealing transactions is the average of approval by disinterested shareholders and ex ante disclosure. 
The index of ex post control of self-dealing transactions is the average of disclosures in periodic filings and ease of 
proving wrongdoing. 
Djankov, La Porta, 
López-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008) 
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WGI The World Governance Index, which is the average of six country-level governance indicators, measures (1) government 
effectiveness; (2) political stability; (3) regulatory quality; (4) rule of law; (5) voice and accountability; and (6) control 
of corruption. For more details about the construction of these six governance indicators, please see Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2006). 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2006) 
Capital regulatory index Capital regulatory index is an index of overall capital stringency and is the sum of the answers to several survey 
questions relating to the extent of regulatory requirements in bank capital and to the sources of funds that count as 
regulatory capital. See Barth et al. (2004, 2013a) for more details. 
Barth et al. (2004, 
2006, 2008, and 
2013a) 
Official supervisory power Official supervisory power is a measure of the power of supervisory agencies, measured using answers to 14 questions 
on the extent to which supervisory authorities have the authority to take actions to prevent and correct problems. See 
Barth et al. (2004, 2013a) for more details. 
Barth et al. (2004, 
2006, 2008, and 
2013a) 
Private monitoring index Private monitoring index is a measure of the extent of bank disclosure requirements and incentives to increase private 
monitoring. See Barth et al. (2004, 2013a) for more details. 
Barth et al. (2004, 
2006, 2008, and 
2013a) 
Ln(Geographical distance) The geographical distance (in miles) between the foreign-owned bank's city of location in the host country and its home 
country's capital city. We make use of spherical geometry and trigonometric math functions to calculate the accurate 
distance between the two locations. Specifically, we first convert each pair of latitude and longitude from decimal 
degrees into radians by dividing their values by 180/π or 57.296. Lat1 (Lat2) and Long1 (Long2) represent the latitudes 
and longitudes in radians of the foreign bank’s city of location (home country’s capital city). We then use the great 
circle distance formula to calculate the distance in miles between two pairs of latitudes and longitudes as follows: 
 
Distance = 3963 × Arccos[Sin(Lat1)Sin(Lat2) + Cos(Lat1)Cos(Lat2)Cos(Long2-Long1)], 
where 3,963 is the radius of the Earth in miles. 
www.mapsofworld.co
m; CEPII 
Ln(Latitude) Natural logarithm of the absolute value of latitude in decimal degrees. It measures the distance of the bank's city of 
location (in the host country) from the equator. 
www.mapsofworld.co
m; CEPII 
Ln(1+Distance from bank city 
to capital city) 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the distance (in miles) from the bank's city of location (in the host country) from the 
capital city of the host country. 
www.mapsofworld.co
m; CEPII 
E/MVt-1 Net income in year t-1, scaled by market capitalization at the end of year t-1.  Bankscope; 
DataStream 
∆Et The annual change in net income from year t-1 to t, scaled by market capitalization at the end of year t-1 (i.e., at the 
beginning of return calculation). 
Bankscope; 
DataStream 
R(t+1 to t+3) The buy-and-hold stock returns from the beginning of year t+1 to the end of year t+3. DataStream 
∆Ei(t+1 to t+3) The sum of the annual changes in net income over year t+1 to t+3, scaled by market capitalization at the end of year t-
1. 
Bankscope; 
DataStream 
MV/TAt-1 The ratio of market capitalization to total assets at the end of year t-1. Bankscope; 
DataStream 
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NOTES 
1  Many posit that foreign banks benefit local markets and trade by boosting credit supply, local banking 
competition, financial development, and exports (see, e.g., Clarke et al., 2005; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009, 2012; 
Bruno and Hauswald, 2014; Bronzini and D'Ignazio, 2017; Claessens et al., 2017). Others find that foreign banks 
transmit adverse shocks from home to host countries and threaten stability (see, e.g., Detragiache et al., 2008; Gormley, 
2010; Cetorell and Goldberg, 2012; Houston et al., 2012). 
2 Market-based oversight includes the use of stock market information by regulators or supervisors to assess bank 
financial conditions, gauge managerial performance, and inform disciplinary actions and intervention policies (see, 
e.g., Flannery, 1998, 2001; Greenspan, 2001; Distinguin et al., 2006; Nier and Baumann, 2006; Kang and Liu, 2008; 
Knaup and Wagner, 2012).   
3 The increasing trends in banking globalization are best described in Claessens and van Horen (2014), who 
manually compile a database of bank ownership covering over 5,000 banks from 137 countries over 1995-2009. Their 
statistics show that the number of local banks decreases by about 18%, whereas the number of foreign-owned banks 
increases by 69% over the period. Such increases in foreign-owned banks are more pronounced in developing markets 
(111% increase) than in OECD countries (38% increase). Most foreign-owned banks are from OECD countries, and 
this composition remains similar over the years. Moreover, the local share of foreign bank assets increased from 20% 
in 1995 to 34% in 2009 (Claessens and van Horen, 2015). 
4 Foreign bank ownership could be viewed as an internal governance mechanism in which foreign owners directly 
monitor management and control their operational and accounting choices. In principle, different governance 
mechanisms could complement or substitute each other (see John and Senbet, 1998; Aguilera et al., 2015). For instance, 
greater monitoring by blockholders such as foreign bank owners may reduce the need for monitoring by bank directors. 
On the other hand, the foreign owners’ monitoring may become more effective as a result of advisory board directors 
who possess strong industry-specific skills and experience. Moreover, foreign bank owners may be more efficient in 
monitoring management in host countries with strong legal systems, shareholder protections, and banking disclosure 
regulations. In section 4.6, we use untabulated analysis to explore potential interactions between foreign bank 
ownership and several country-level proxies of external and internal governance mechanisms. 
5 We thank the authors for making the data publicly available. 
6 Our results are qualitatively similar if we instead denominate the variables in the local currencies (unreported). 
7 Because the independent variables are lagged one year, the independent variables of 1996 explain the dependent 
variable of 1997. Therefore, our final sample covers 1997-2012. 
8 The distance database is available via http:// www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
9  The use of Wednesday-to-Wednesday returns helps mitigate problems of thin trading as well as other 
confounding seasonal effects, such as the Monday effect. Following Francis et al. (2015), we trim bank stock weekly 
returns that are below -25% or above +25% to avoid potential coding errors in DataStream. 
10 The authors exclude countries with few banks, remove smaller banks and holding companies, and adjust for 
bank mergers, as well as the timing of entry and exit. For more details, please refer to Claessens and van Horen (2014). 
11 After we obtain the predicted SYNCH from the fitted model (holding all other variables at their mean values) 
for both foreign and local banks, we invert equation (2) to solve for the implied R2: 
R2= exp(SYNCH)/(exp(SYNCH)+1). 
Hutton et al. (2009) use a similar approach in quantifying economic magnitude. 
12 Common law countries have greater shareholder protections than civil law countries, which could in turn 
influence financial market development (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2008). 
13 We also use a propensity score matching approach to address potential endogeneity problems. Our results show 
that foreign-owned banks have on average 16.2% lower implied R2 than domestic banks (significant at the 1% level), 
matched by baseline bank characteristics and country and year fixed effects using propensity score matching 
techniques. The details and unreported results are in table IA.4 of the online appendix. 
14 Furthermore, we estimate Heckman-type endogenous treatment-regression models following the two-step 
estimator of Maddala (1983). In the first stage, we obtain probit estimates from a treatment equation that models the 
foreign bank status as a function of the two instrumental variables (in section 4.3), bank and country controls, and 
year fixed effects. We augment the regression model via the inverse Mills ratio. We estimate the endogenous 
treatment-regression models for the baseline model specification (in table 3), the robustness tests controlling for host 
country characteristics (panel B of table 3), the earnings innovations tests (in table 5), and the robustness tests based 
on discretionary loan loss provisions (in table IA.10 of the online appendix). Although estimates for the inverse Mills 
ratio are significant in most cases (except for the model under the baseline specification), the coefficients of Foreign 
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remain similar in significance. These results are in tables IA.5, IA.6, IA.7, and IA.8 of the online appendix, 
respectively. 
15 We need instruments that are correlated with Foreign (the inclusion restriction) but are uncorrelated with 
SYNCH except through the variable (the exclusion restriction). Finding such instruments is extremely difficult; hence, 
we acknowledge that our instruments are far from perfect but instead represent a best effort. 
16 See, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2001), Beck et al. (2003), Bose et al. (2014), etc. 
17 To be a valid instrument, initial endowments should not directly determine price synchronicity. There is some 
support from the literature. For instance, Hall and Jones (1999) find evidence, later confirmed by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001), that distance from the equator does not determine economic performance (Hall and Jones, 1999). Though the 
assumption of instrument exogeneity is untestable, we shed some light by analyzing the pairwise correlation between 
Ln(Latitude) and SYNCH in our sample. The correlation coefficient is 0.01 and is statistically insignificant. 
18 We treat all explanatory variables except year dummies as endogenous and instrumented them with the t-3 to 
t-5 lagged dependent and independent variables for the difference equation and their respective lagged differences for 
the level regression. 
19 Dasgupta et al. (2010) show that stock price synchronicity is positively associated with market transparency 
because more informative stock prices today imply that less private information is incorporated into stock prices in 
the future. Lee and Liu (2011) find a U-shaped relationship between idiosyncratic return variation and several 
alternative measures of price informativeness. Xing and Anderson (2011) document an inversely U-shaped 
relationship between proxies for public firm-specific information and stock return synchronicity. 
20 Because the surveys were completed in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2012, following Barth et al. (2013b), we use the 
first survey of 1999 for the regulation variables for 1997-2001. The values for the regulatory variables in 2002-2004 
are from the second survey of 2003. We use the third survey of 2007 for the regulatory variables for 2005-2007. The 
last survey of 2012 determines the values of the regulatory variables for 2008-2012. 
21 We collect the pair of latitude and longitude coordinates (in decimals) for each foreign bank’s city of location 
(in the host city) and its home country’s capital city from www.mapsofworld.com. We use spherical geometry and 
trigonometric math functions to calculate accurate distances between locations. Specifically, we first convert each pair 
of latitudes and longitudes from decimal degrees to radians by dividing their values by 180/π or 57.296. Lat1 (Lat2) 
and Long1 (Long2) represent the latitude and longitude in radians of a foreign bank’s city of location (home country’s 
capital city). We then use the great circle distance formula to calculate the distance in miles between two pairs of 
latitudes and longitudes, as follows: 
Distance = 3963 × Arccos[Sin(Lat1)Sin(Lat2) + Cos(Lat1)Cos(Lat2)Cos(Long2-Long1)], 
where 3,963 is the radius of the Earth in miles.  
22 Because we do not observe relative distance in governance and banking regulation variables for the non-
foreign-owned banks, our sample is incidentally truncated and thus subject to a potential sample-selection bias. If the 
unobserved variables that determine whether a bank receives foreign ownership correlate with those that determine 
its price synchronicity, our regression estimates would be biased. In an unreported analysis, to control for this potential 
sample-selection bias, we use the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure. Using the bank and country controls, year 
fixed effects, and the two instruments as defined in section 4.3, we estimate a first-stage probit regression to identify 
the likelihood of the bank being foreign-owned. We include the estimated inverse Mills ratio in the second-stage price 
synchronicity regressions to account for a potential correlation between the error of the first-stage probit and the 
second-stage OLS regressions. Because the inverse Mills ratios in all models are insignificant, the sample-selection 
bias is likely not severe, and, hence, we drop them in the main analysis. These unreported results are available upon 
request. 
